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# British University Border Control: Institutionalization and Resistance to Racialized Capitalism/Neoliberalism

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*This article will chart the history of the university in Britain as a site of border control. It will then describe the future of the university via narrative and dystopian sci-fi. Before numerous independence declarations, the borders of Britain's Empire were vast and fluid. The British Nationality Act of 1948 afforded hundreds of millions of subjects the right to live and work in the UK without a visa. Subsequent immigration acts (1968 and 1972) restricted access and eliminated the distinction between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth citizens. The studia generalia of twelfth-century Europe was characterized by nomadic scholars who would travel extensively to form ad hoc communities around scholars and locations. Thus the Eurocentric tradition of university education is mobile across borders. The "international student" is a modern phenomenon. There is a history of state spying, recruitment and surveillance in universities. But the co-option of the university as a disciplinary apparatus of state border control occurred after mass migration. The university has morphed into a soft border. Thomas Docherty, in *For the University: Democracy and the Future of the Institution* (2011), suggests that the Conservative Government under Thatcher created a culture of mistrust in the academy in order to justify spending cuts and increase government control. The soft border has advanced into our classrooms; academics enact border control by taking attendance registers linked to T4 visa enforcement. The surveillance of student's speech, writing and thought is prescribed by "Prevent" legislation. The article will conclude by looking at futurist narrative accounts of the university as a disciplinary agent of state control, such as Roberto Bolaño's 2666, in which the university and the police force are unified. The article will outline the historical specificity of the British case, but the theoretical and literary analysis will involve comparative work, particularly in Britain's former settler colonies.*

**Keywords:**

## INTRODUCTION

In Roberto Bolaño's novel 2666, the university is twinned with the police force. As Martin Eve notes, Don Pedro Negrete, head of police, is the "twin brother of the university rector" (Bolaño cited in Eve, p. 103). Aspects of this dystopian fictional future are currently playing out in British universities. The most prominent manifestations of border control in universities include monitoring international students in classrooms on behalf of the government (through the Tier 4 visa regime), police registration and *Prevent*

legislation (the controversial statutory obligation to monitor students for signs of extremism and radicalization). *Prevent* has been characterized as thought-policing and has implications for freedom of thought, expression and assembly. This article will describe just part of a series of policies aimed at creating a “hostile environment” for all migrants to the UK, the political context in which those policies evolved and outline some ways in which resistance movements work around this hostile environment.

Monitoring of this kind reproduces and extends institutionalized racism in universities identified by various scholars (Ahmed, 2012; Chatterjee and Maira, 2014; Andrews, 2013). Movements have played a huge role in resisting institutionalized racism (Rhodes Must Fall and Why is My Curriculum White?), campus border control and thought policing (Unis Resist Border Control, Justice4Sanaz, SOAS Justice for Cleaners, KCL Justice for Cleaners, Fighting Against Casualisation in Education, Don’t Deport Luqman, PhD For Ahmed, Save Kelechi, Save Lord, Students Not Suspects, I Dissent From Prevent by University College Union, Scotland Against Criminalising Communities, Prevent Watch and CAGE). Reviewing the evolution of the British university as border control, and the resistance to it, offers insight into the institutional dimensions of racialized capitalism/neoliberalism. This will be useful for the purposes of comparative education studies outside of the UK, particularly if those countries and contexts base their tertiary education systems on the British model.

The university as border control has profound implications for international education, educational rights and pedagogies. UNESCO reports that international student numbers rose from 2.8 to 4.1 million between 2005 and 2013 (2015, p. 151). The UK is second only to the US, taking 11% of international students (International Trade Administration, 2016, p. 5). International students are poised on a political fault line: do they constitute “migrants” or “students” for the purposes of immigration figures? International students are a lucrative benefit to the British economy, worth £25.8 billion a year (Universities UK, 2017, p. 2). But they are also perceived by the neoliberal state as an economic and cultural threat should they choose to stay and work or claim asylum during their studies. International students, international staff and other migrant workers are held in a state of calculated precarity, exacerbated by impending Brexit.

The policy agenda creating a hostile environment is counter to intellectual development and is turning universities into “hotbeds of division and discrimination” (Liberty, 2018). But this extractive situation maximizes economic benefits whilst rendering students and staff politically docile through monitoring and reporting. In doing so, British universities are institutional enforcers of racialized capitalism/neoliberalism. But the creation of a hostile environment – a regime of surveillance, arrest, detention and or deportation – enforced by the public sector public institutions has generated (and necessitates) another mode of resistance, outside state control.

## **POLITICAL CONTEXT**

The policies and laws that facilitated the hostile environment were introduced by New Labour. This was particularly evident in the development of an increasingly punitive welfare benefits system. But its ideological precursor was Reagan and Thatcherite neoliberalism. New Labour’s investment in Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and other programs invested public money in private providers and set the scene for the neoliberal colonization of the service and public sectors by global corporations (in the UK, G4S,

Atos, Serco and Capita) (White, 2017). This trajectory created a large corporate, increasingly privatized, tertiary education system now worth billions to the national economy and has also facilitated big state intervention, mass surveillance, and the entanglement of public institutions with security and border control.

New Labour created the architecture of the hostile environment, which the Coalition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition, 2010) and Conservative governments further mobilized (UK Border Act 2007, UK Borders Bill 2011). The Coalition government created the “Hostile Environment Working Group,” expressly formed to make life for migrants in British unlivable (Aitkenhead and Wintour, 2013). This group developed the reforms which would appear in the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016. Academics, teachers, doctors, landlords, social workers and family courts are to act as border guards. A missed lecture, a housing application, a visit to the nurse or homeless shelter could result in arrest, detention and deportation. The end goal appears to be a self-policing state. Racialized capitalism / neoliberalism of this kind does not require the Stasi because it compels public workers and reinforces their compliance with fear (propaganda) and precarity (erosion of welfare and labor conditions).

The Immigration Act 2016 further expands the hostile environment. Of particular relevance to tertiary education are the restrictions implemented by Section 10, on Immigration Bail (UK Government, 2016). This reframing of what bail means will have a fundamental effect on the expansion of state powers and community control mechanisms for migrants in the UK. SOAS Detainee Support states: “Anyone ‘liable to be detained’ can now be subjected to immigration bail and the punitive conditions bail enables residence requirements, reporting requirements, electronic tagging” (2018). From Section 10 of the Act: “if immigration bail is granted to a person, it must be granted subject to one or more of the following conditions [...] a condition restricting the person’s work, occupation or studies in the United Kingdom [my emphasis]” (UK Government, 2016). Up to this point, one of the lifelines for those seeking asylum in the UK (those seeking asylum are not allowed to work) has been to attend college. Bail conditions currently handed out include prohibitions on participation in education. As the recent controversy over the Windrush Generation illustrates, those “without status” can extend to individuals who have resided in the UK for more than fifty years (Al-Jazeera News, 2018).

Home Affairs is reserved to Westminster, however, there are interesting differences between the ways in which the devolved administrations have implemented bordering practices and surveillance laws. For example, the legal obligations in *Prevent* apply in England and Wales, with distinct guidance (although hardly any substantive difference) to Scotland; the duty does not apply in the north of Ireland (UCU, 2015: 1). Despite the legislation applying in Scotland there are differences in implementation, a freedom of information request to Police Scotland revealed there had been just three referrals from *Prevent* from 2011-2016; all were related to people the police described as “white Scottish” (SACC, 2017). The 2016 Higher Education Governance Act passed by the Scottish Parliament (partly a result of union and student pressure) reinforces the internal democracy of Scottish higher education institutions. Although modest progress, it does signal a different education policy climate north of the border.

The impact of neoliberal governance on universities and education has been extensively theorized (Brown, 2015; Giroux, 2014; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2009). Successive

governments managed to encroach on the autonomy of universities, which has enabled the drift of the state border into the classroom. The neoliberal politics of Reagan and Thatcher focused on budgetary deficits and targeted spending cuts specifically on education:

Since then the most conspicuous features of neoliberal policy have been the attachment of price tickets to public services and the pursuit of self-financing. These policies have been and are being implemented by a new class of managers who justify their approach with reference to free market ideology but who at the same time have introduced an unprecedented network of controls. (Lorenz, 2012, p. 599)

The impact of “new managerialism” has also impacted bordering practices (Barry, 2004). Democratic processes inside universities have receded under new managerialism. An example of this is the empowerment of senior management (the University Court) over academic senate. Academic Senate is a democratic body made up of scholars, Court consists of managers that traditionally made financial decisions, but increasingly, have commanded power over and above the collective power of academics. Capano, Regini and Turri state, “governance reforms inspired by a corporate enterprise model have reduced the decision-making power of the traditional collegial bodies representing the academic staff (Senates or Academic Boards)” (2016, p. 8).

The erosion of labor rights and mass casualization of academic labor also facilitates bordering practices in classrooms. In 2016, University College Union reported that 54% of all academic staff and 49% of all academic teaching staff are on insecure contracts (UCU, 2016). This is also combined with loss of tenure for pre-existing staff. McCormack and Salmeniemmi note that, “structures of neoliberal capitalism institutionalize precarity through these processes of inclusion and exclusion, marketization and privatization, and show how they exacerbate existing global and local inequalities and create newer forms of injustice” (2016, p. 7). Precarity is constitutive of capitalism. However, neoliberal capitalism as has extended precariousness to traditionally sheltered and privileged groups (and institutions), such as middle and upper class white populations (Puar et al., 2012). This is increasingly evident in the Brexit debate, and from the liberal media, as white people from the Global North find themselves also targeted by this hostile environment. Precarity pacifies dissent. Students are made compliant through debt and staff by insecure employment contracts (Williams, 2006); both are subjected to bordering practices. Under this arrangement the prerogatives of education slide in place of capital accumulation and survival.

## **UNIVERSITIES AND BORDER (VISA) CONTROL**

From 2008-2010 the Labour government transformed the administration of UK immigration visas by introducing the Points Based System, administered primarily by the UK Border Agency (now UK Visa and Immigration), and now also by higher and further education institutions. International, non-EU students must apply for a Tier 4 visa. International students applying for a T4 visa are required to obtain sponsorship from a university before they are granted a visa to enter the UK. There is an attendant responsibility for the university to monitor the fulfilment of the visa conditions. This legislation tied universities and colleges to the Home Office – and thus to border control – in an unprecedented way. For the first time, academic and administrative staff became responsible for monitoring the attendance and whereabouts of their international students, for reporting the information (and suspicious behavior) to the state.

In 2012 the British coalition government sought to bind universities ever more to border control. A requirement was introduced that all educational providers wishing to enroll students on T4 visas had to obtain “Tier 4 Visa Sponsor status” (UK Government, 2014). The government ensures compliance to this border regime by implementing (and threatening to withdraw) this trusted status from universities. Arguing that as universities are beneficiaries of immigration they ought to participate in preventing “abuse” and “immigration crime” (UK Government, 2010, p.14). However, UK government’s research in 2010 revealed that as few as 2% of students were found to be “non-compliant” (2010, p. 9).

As international student fees now contribute £4.8 billion to British universities in tuition fees (14% of their total income) (Universities UK, 2017), the withdrawal of this trusted status will likely have a profound impact on university and college finances (Education Commission, 2013, p. 3). Concurrent to the government-imposed trusted status requirements, there has been a steady decline in central government spending on higher education. The European University Association reports that public funding for UK higher education has fallen 28% (nominal change) from 2010 to 2016 to less than 0.5% GDP (2016). Universities’ futures are tied first, to securing international students as a significant percentage of income, and second, acting as border agents by monitoring and surveilling those students.

### **THE PEDAGOGY OF BORDER (VISA) CONTROL**

Matt Jenkins (2014) identifies two impacts of the university as border control – first, changes to institutional structures and second, the refashioning of subjectivities. Concerning structural change, Jenkins notes, “New reporting requirements entail new or adapted mechanisms to collect information, new technologies of collation, new roles of data management and response” (2014, p. 268). This constitutes a subtle shift in authority away from academics and classrooms to administration. As opposition to discriminatory elements of student surveillance grows from academics and students, surveillance mechanisms are embedded in administration and jobs created for the monitoring and compliance of international students. As border work becomes the remit of dedicated compliance staff it is rendered invisible. In an empirical study into bordering practices in universities, conducted by Marina Burke, a research participant said:

Offices were set up, people were put into jobs, bureaucrats got work to do, and therefore we ended up in this situation with people requiring you to do this. [Tier 4 monitoring] was brought into being by bureaucracy as a creative force [...] designing forms to make their lives easy so that they can do the kind of surveillance that they interpret is required by a set of legislation. (2016, p. 29)

Regarding border control, subjectivity and the T4 visa regime, Jenkins argues:

Such conditions redefine the identity of ‘student’, taking it out of the university’s control and re-basing it on non-academic criteria. Those tutoring border-crossers can now treat them as ‘students’ only on the basis of their physical presence at pre-determined checkpoints. (2014, p. 265)

This has basic discriminatory and pedagogic consequences. The student body is divided between those that must be physically present through choice and through compulsion. What happens to intellectual interests or competing timetables? “It represents a radical denial of their autonomy over their studies” (2014, p. 265). There is a pedagogic weight

to attendance which does not apply to the privileged student (these are “home” students, but also students from privileged countries or with enough monetary wealth to rise above immigration control), who will be judged on academic performance alone. For those “outsiders,”

...the act of education loses its co-operative aspect and instead becomes a one-directional enforcement of a syllabus; they become subjects of a power which their peers retain an ability to negotiate. (2014, p. 267)

As noted, the self-evidently discriminatory dimension to the monitoring of international students has caused some universities to roll out that surveillance to all students, eliciting mixed reactions. On the one hand, embedding (but not eliminating) direct discrimination, on the other, anaesthetizing resistance to it. The softer, subtler process of extending surveillance to all students produced, in part, the “desired docile bodies” across the board (Lyon, 2006, p. 28). The idea of docile bodies recalls Michel Foucault’s argument in *Discipline and Punish* (1995) about the relationship between institutionally rendered discipline and political power.

Burke’s research also reveals the racialized nature of the new subjectivities created by university bordering practices (2016). This builds on a history of scholarship on institutionalized racism and Islamophobia in the Westernized university (Ahmed, 2012; Andrews, 2013; Nabi, 2011). Commenting on race and higher education in Britain, Claire Alexander and Jason Arday note:

University institutions have themselves proved remarkably resilient to change in terms of curriculum, culture and staffing, remaining for the most part ‘ivory towers’ – with the emphasis on ‘ivory.’ (2015, p. 4)

Groups like *Rhodes Must Fall* in Oxford and *Why Is My Curriculum White?* have argued for the decolonization of institutions which, whilst espousing liberalism, are actually structurally (and frequently openly) racist and Islamophobic. Sara Ahmed conducted a qualitative study on diversity work in universities, finding that equality and diversity work is used to gloss over institutionalized racism, offering a veneer of action, but often without substantive structural change (2012). International students are increasingly important to British universities financially but they are also important participants in the diversity agenda. Universities develop marketing strategies on the basis of appearing international, this sense of openness, accessibility and liberalism can be a lucrative advertising tool at home and abroad. However, the reality of the T4 visa regime, combined with police registration for students from certain countries, reveals a different reality in which international students, specifically those on T4 visa and/or students of color face enhanced regimes of surveillance. Monitoring and surveilling students should therefore be considered crucial in the struggle against institutional racism in the university.

The sense of discrimination between national identities, and white and non-white students, is exacerbated by the additional burden of students from certain countries who are required to register with the police. This burden clearly disproportionately affects students from the global south, who are more heavily scrutinized for their visas before they arrive (UK Government, 2017). Within T4 visa regime, there are differences and ambiguities on how it is attained and implemented according to racial, linguistic and national identities.

## PREVENT

*Prevent* is a British statutory legal instrument, part of the UK's counterterrorism strategy. It emerged in 2002 in the aftermath of 9/11. *Prevent* is pre-emptive in that it targets activities, beliefs, behaviors, ideological positions, even emotions, which are not criminal but indicative of intent. *Prevent* is another manifestation of border control, as the university is drawn in to work with the police to control and monitor people intellectually and practically at the level of action, speech, thought and appearance.

In 2015 the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, imposed a legal duty on public bodies and their staff, to surveil the public (UK Government, 2015). The hostile environment policies extend to the public sector and beyond (the Immigration Act 2016 increasingly compels private landlords to report immigration status). The Conservatives also singled out universities specifically as institutions that needed to “step up” to tackle radicalization, extremism and terrorism. In his speech on extremism in Birmingham, David Cameron said, “We need universities to stand up against extremism,” “to do their bit,” against the “poison of Islamic extremism” (2015).

The Government defines “extremism” in the *Prevent* strategy as: “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces” (2015, p. 3). The government also notes that “non-violent extremism [...] can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism” and therefore is reportable (2015, p. 3).

The British government defines “radicalisation” as a process by which “a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity” (Cameron, 2015, p. 4). Policy thus implies that there is an identifiable relationship between ideas and terrorist violence. Aislinn O'Donnell points out that government understandings of radicalization mobilize tautological and formal reasoning, they fail “to explain what radicalisation is, what it means or even how it works” (2016, p. 55). The sense of ambiguity over radicalization is compounded as educators and public servants are required to look for those at risk of radicalization.

In 2016, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, criticized the British government's *Prevent* strategy, suggesting:

The lack of definitional clarity, combined with the encouragement of people to report suspicious activity, have created unease and uncertainty around what can legitimately be discussed in public [...] It appears that *Prevent* is having the opposite of its intended effect: by dividing, stigmatising and alienating segments of the population. (2016)

Despite critical material on the conceptual veracity of “radicalisation” (Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Horgan, 2008), the last government review intended to strengthen *Prevent* (House of Lords, 2016).

For the purpose of educators and public service providers adhering to *Prevent*, vulnerable individuals are broadly defined as those suffering personal crisis (bullying, race/hate crime, lack of self-esteem, family tensions, personal or political grievances); identity crisis (disaffection and disconnection); those in contact with criminality; perceptions of injustice, rejection of civic life (Nabulsi, 2017, p. 17). The *Prevent* strategic review in

2011 notes, “support for all kinds of violent extremism is more prevalent not only among the young but among lower socio-economic and income groups” (UK Government, 2011, p. 18). Inferring that educators should be aware of increased likelihood of radicalization and extremism in poor and working-class students.

The UN Special Rapporteur noted “the duty imposed on certain categories of public officials, including teachers, to observe, record and report individuals they may consider ‘extremist’ has led to undue restrictions on student union activities and the singling out of students from minority communities” (2016). Muslim students – and those who appear Muslim – are experiencing the discriminatory impact of Prevent on campus (Nabulsi, 2017, p. 17). *Prevent*’s overt focus on “Islamic extremism” makes this inevitable (UK Government, 2015, p. 3). Indeed, between the period 2007-2010, 67% of referrals to the police (England and Wales) were Muslim (UK Government, 2011, p. 60). Universities must now face up to their involvement in the systematic and discriminatory surveillance of Muslim religious, political and public life on British campuses.

### **UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND PREVENT**

There is an obvious tension between the imperatives of policing, which is based on gathering information about people, and those of education, which is based on empowering students to think critically and learn how to express their views in effective ways. [...]

But, for a state with a deeply unpopular foreign policy, a generation of young people able to critically analyze what is happening in the world and organize themselves to change it is perhaps a greater source of anxiety than terrorism itself. (Kundnani, 2014, p. 182)

The deployment of border practices and counterterrorism measures has the potential to alter educational processes, practices and institutions. Teaching and administrative staff are being asked to monitor students for signs of vulnerability. Professor Baroness Ruth Lister’s open letter (signed by hundreds of academics) states: “*Prevent* will have a chilling effect on open debate, free speech and political dissent. It will create an environment in which political change can no longer be discussed openly, and will withdraw to unsupervised spaces” (Independent Voices, 2015). The Russell Group consultation document on the 2015 Act concurs:

Enabling free debate within the law is a key function which universities perform in our democratic society.

The intention to include non-violent extremism within the scope of Prevent work in universities is a particular problem as it conflicts with the obligation to protect free speech. Given the existing legal duty to which they are subject, universities should retain the freedom to encourage free discussion of ideas, however radical, within the law.

... [this may] drive those with radical views off campus and ‘underground’, where those views cannot be challenged in an open environment. Closing down challenge and debate could foster extremism and dissent within communities. (2015, p. 3.1, 3.3)

O’Donnell points out that the paternalism inherent in suggesting that students are “vulnerable” to radical ideas has its roots in colonial governance (2015, p. 58). She notes that the language of vulnerability and resilience – notions of individual wellbeing, safety and care as relevant to national security – extends Foucault’s idea of pastoral power and bio-governance (2015, p. 58). The transformative potential of education is bound up in critical encounters with oppositional, alienating and challenging ideas. This process is frequently troubling, as it also leads to feelings of estrangement from previously



unquestioned prejudices and orthodoxies. Student's polemical tendencies should be encouraged as it is the process of mediation of radical ideas, by peers and by tutors, that leads to changes in perspective and the honing of critical faculties. Educational institutions risk losing much of their transformative potential. *Prevent* risks all of this, but perhaps, as the guide quote to this section alludes, it intends to. The silencing and suppressing of centers of dissent (classrooms) must be regarded as an obvious – intentioned or unintentional – outcome of the policy.

*Prevent* disrupts the student / teacher relationship as the educator is drawn into the role of state informer. Drawing on J. M. Coetzee's work on censorship, O'Donnell cites with approval Coetzee's claim that "the diffusion of paranoia is not inadvertent; it is a technique of control" (2015, p. 61). This paranoia extends to students and staff alike. It is a burden on teaching staff to consider their own arguments, but also, paternalistically, to consider what their students say, for fear of reprisal. The extra burden on academics of color, or Muslim academics, falls particularly heavily.

This silencing and chilling effect applies to all students – *Prevent* already has the potential to surveil and criminalize the ideas and values of the radical left, anarchists, environmentalists and so on – but it must be stressed that the racist dynamic to its application has a specific impact on Muslims and students of color. This too, has epistemic implications, as Kundnani points out: "a transformative politics is more likely to emerge from racialized sections of society" (2014, p. 284). In addition to this, the *Prevent* guidelines already pinpoint poor and working-class students as more likely to harbor "extreme" ideas, so by extension, poor and working-class students of color are those most likely to be affected by the policy.

Professor Lister's open letter suggests that students will "withdraw to unsupervised spaces," and this is echoed by the Russell Group who express concern that *Prevent* may "drive those with radical views off campus and 'underground', where those views cannot be challenged in an open environment." Indeed, universities are intellectually neutered and risk irrelevance as educational spaces in the current hostile environment. But critics of the liberal public sphere have questioned its premise as an open environment (Asad et al., 2013). Ever since Jürgen Habermas (1989 [1962]) recognized and theorized the importance of the public sphere, critics have pointed out that it operates through systematic exclusion and thus invariably involves speech by power (Asad, 2003). The persecution of pro-Palestine activism under *Prevent* and the silence on Israeli state intervention (through financial support of pro-Zionist propaganda and diplomatic intervention) on British campuses is evidence of this (Nabulsi, 2017; Jackman, 2017). In other words, radical challenges to the status quo have taken place, necessarily, outside the university. Discourse by power is only exacerbated by the monitoring, surveillance and thought policing of students and staff on campus.

Campaigns, groups and movements which work on the issue of racism and borders with an intersectional analysis, like Unis Resist Border Control, Justice4Sanaz, SOAS Justice for Cleaners, KCL Justice for Cleaners, Fighting Against Casualisation in Education, Don't Deport Luqman, PhD For Ahmed, Save Kelechi, Save Lord, Students Not Suspects, I Dissent From Prevent, Prevent Watch, illustrate the importance of continuing to fight from within higher education institutions. British universities continue to be important to those who choose to work and study within them. However, the more pervasive the impact of the hostile environment, the more initiatives outside public

institutions take root. This can be read as an opportunity not (as Professor Lister and the Russell Group) solely as a threat.

### **WORKING AROUND THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT**

In Glasgow, a dedicated women's night shelter will open in 2018 (the first of its kind in the UK) providing short term accommodation for women with no recourse to public funds. This includes non-EEA women with limited leave to remain (students, asylum seekers pending a final resolution of their claims); women who have status but face delays in accessing benefits; citizens and women with leave to remain but no access to housing benefits and welfare. The shelter 'defined by our no borders ethos' is run and managed only by people with direct experience of the asylum, immigration system and destitution: they see the shelter as "active ongoing resistance to the dehumanising and brutalising effects of borders" (Ubuntu, 2018). Similarly, both as positive political commitment to herbal medicine and in response to the inadequacies of state health care, Herby Unity, provides "herbal support in Glasgow to people in & affected by the asylum system and their allies [...] we run support days offering freshly made hot food, massage, a drop in herbal dispensary and herbal consultations, herbal study & herb growing" (Herbal Unity, 2018). As noted in the above, the UK Immigration Act 2016 expands the hostile environment yet further into public service provision, with new bail conditions threatening to prevent those "without status" participating in the education system. One potential response to this is setting up Free Schools, Cooperative Universities or educational structures outside state control for all those excluded from our education system. The Centre for Human Ecology / Govan Folk University in Glasgow is one model, there are many others (CHE, 2018).

The hostile environment, pervasive surveillance and punitive community control measures, necessitates resistance from within but also new ways to work around it. A perennial question for those involved in working outside state structures is of taking responsibility for public services, removing the obligation from the state and eroding a culture of state provision. Although, of course, there are those ideologically (by necessity or choice) in favor of working outside institutionalized state structures. However, there is the potential that alternative and parallel structures build power but need not necessarily replace or forego state provision. Taking power and building resources – the safety, skills, vision, ideas and energy – to demand and compel the state towards widening public provision. Indeed, historically, taking back power is one of the principal ways to force the state to redistribute its resources. As part of this equation, the state and its institutions desire power, authority and control of populations. If alternative structures start to threaten the state (with radical ideas, movements and mobilizations) this may also feed into widening access to public provision.

### **CONCLUSION**

British university bordering practices are institutionally racist and impact most aggressively on those students and staff who face the intersecting oppressions of race, gender, ability, class and sexuality. As these bordering practices dovetail with the punitive surveillance state they are supported by both left, right and center of the British political establishment, indeed, their administrative (and ideological) precursors were introduced by the liberal left in New Labour.

British universities are currently beset by the logic of corporate expansion and growth. This requires a precarious and politically docile stream of capital via international students to replace public funding. Although, particularly in the post-Brexit environment there are some signs of a chilling effect on international student preferences for Britain. However, it is still second only to the US in international student preferences (International Trade Administration, 2016, p. 5). This flow is dependent on globalized, racialized neoliberal capitalism. In terms of where we turn to resist the university as border control, we must be aware that university management and the state government elite have very similar interests in mind.

The recent University College Union strike was one of the most powerful in its history (Parfitt, 2018). It illustrates that there the will to fight is strong within the British university system. The power of the strike derived from student radicalism and support, but also that striking union members brought diverse interests and intersectional analysis to the picket line. For example, at the University of Glasgow picket line there were banners to support the Yarl's Wood hunger strikers. The strike mobilized many detractors to the current predicament of British universities, triggered by eroding labor conditions, but fought along many other lines. Radical Teach Outs at Glasgow sketched the connection between precarious labor and border control on campus. This political juncture will strengthen the many groups, movements and campaigns working on racist bordering practices inside the university. These must be twinned with efforts to work around and outside the hostile environment.

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